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English auctions and the Stolper–Samuelson theorem

Dubra, Juan and Echenique, Federico and Manelli, Alejandro M. (2008) English auctions and the Stolper–Samuelson theorem. Journal of Economic Theory, 144 . pp. 825-849. ISSN 0022-0531. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:DUBjet08

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Abstract

We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the Stolper–Samuelson theorem, one for economies with n goods and n factors, and one for non-square economies. Similar assumptions and methods underlie these seemingly unrelated results.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.001DOIUNSPECIFIED
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Echenique, Federico0000-0002-1567-6770
Additional Information:© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Received 6 February 2007; final version received 26 December 2007; accepted 8 July 2008.Available online 17 July 2008. The results in this paper were circulated earlier as two separate papers: “Minimal Assumptions for Efficiency in Asymmetric English auctions,” by Dubra, and “Comparative Statics, English auctions and the Stolper–Samuelson theorem,” by Echenique and Manelli. We thank Rabah Amir, Sergei Izmalkov, Vijay Krishna, Preston McAfee, Peter Neary, John Quah, Kevin Reffett, and Chris Shannon for useful comments. Manelli’s research was partially supported by NSF grants SES-0095524 and SES-0241373.
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
NSF (for Manelli's research)SES-0095524, SES-0241373
Subject Keywords:Auction theory; International trade; Monotone comparative statics; Global univalence
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:DUBjet08
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:DUBjet08
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:13750
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Lindsay Cleary
Deposited On:09 Jul 2009 18:46
Last Modified:26 Nov 2019 11:15

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