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Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets

Boyle, Elette and Echenique, Federico (2009) Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets. Social Choice and Welfare, 33 (1). pp. 87-99. ISSN 0176-1714. doi:10.1007/s00355-008-0347-3.

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We study sequential bargaining in many-to-one matching markets. We show that there is an advantage to entering late in the market, and that the last agent to enter the market will receive his or her best partner in a stable matching, extending the results of Blum and Rothblum (J Econ Theory 103(2):429–443, 2002) and Cechlárová (Randomized matching mechanism revisited. Mimeo, Safarik University, 2002) for the marriage model.We also discuss the relation between sequential bargaining and a possible alternative formulation based on the NTU Shapley value.

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Echenique, Federico0000-0002-1567-6770
Additional Information:© Springer-Verlag 2008. Received: 28 December 2007; accepted: 14 October 2008. We thank Peter Biró and Utku Ünver for their advice on the related literature.We also thank an anonymous referee for comments.
Issue or Number:1
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:BOYscw08
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Official Citation:Boyle, E. & Echenique, F. Soc Choice Welf (2009) 33: 87.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:13753
Deposited By: Lindsay Cleary
Deposited On:09 Jul 2009 18:51
Last Modified:08 Nov 2021 22:40

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