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An experimental test of combinatorial information markets

Ledyard, John O. and Hanson, Robin and Ishikida, Takashi (2009) An experimental test of combinatorial information markets. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 69 (2). pp. 182-189. ISSN 0167-2681. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2008.04.010.

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While a simple information market lets one trade on the probability of each value of a single variable, a full combinatorial information market lets one trade on any combination of values of a set of variables, including any conditional or joint probability. In laboratory experiments, we compare the accuracy of simple markets, two kinds of combinatorial markets, a call market and a market maker, isolated individuals who report to a scoring rule, and two ways to combine those individual reports into a group prediction. We consider two environments with asymmetric information on sparsely correlated binary variables, one with three subjects and three variables, and the other with six subjects and eight variables (thus 256 states).

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Additional Information:© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.Received 1 March 2007;accepted 1 April 2008;available online 13 September 2008. For their comments, we thank David Porter, Ryan Oprea, and participants of seminars at George Mason University, Brigham YoungUniversity,University of Michigan, James MadisonUniversity,University of California at Los Angeles, Overture Research, Microsoft Research, and the DIMACS Workshop on Markets as Predictive Devices. We thank DARPA for financial support.
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Subject Keywords:Prediction; Acquisition; Bias; Quantal response;Prediction; Acquisition;Bias;Quantal response
Issue or Number:2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:LEDjebo09
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:13826
Deposited By: Lindsay Cleary
Deposited On:02 Apr 2009 19:00
Last Modified:08 Nov 2021 22:40

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