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EUGENICS IN THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN,
1890 to 1930: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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HUMANITIES WORKING PAPER 19

January 1979

While much has been written about the history of eugenics in the United States and in Britain, most studies of the subject are confined to one country or the other.¹ Yet the British and American eugenics movements lend themselves to illuminating comparative analysis.² Both found their spiritual father in Francis Galton, who had begun preaching his eugenic creed in the 1860s and who coined the word "eugenics" in his Inquiries into the Human Faculty of 1883. Before the turn of the century, Galton's doctrine failed to gain a substantial following in either country. While social commentators of the day were, like Galton, confirmed Darwinians, unlike Galton they tended to adhere to Lamarckian assumptions of acquired characteristics. In this view, desirable social qualities might be bred into individual hereditary lines by forming a healthy social environment. Thus nurture, in the prevailing outlook, played at least as great a role in social development as nature. But by the 1890s, spurred along by the advent of Weissmanism, British and American social analysts were giving more weight to heredity in the shaping of social character and, by extension, were creating an intellectual climate more favorable to the reception of Galton's eugenic doctrines. Thus, when Galton delivered a eugenic talk before the Sociological Society in London early in the century, he precipitated considerable interest in eugenics.³ Soon eugenic ideas became widely current in Britain and spread rapidly to the United States.

The scientific foundations of eugenics acquired a considerable boost from the post-1900 growth of Mendelian genetics. Various books and articles popularized the new theory of heredity. Like Charles B. Davenport, the director of the Station of Experimental Evolution of the Carnegie Institution at Cold Spring Harbor, New York, the various authors made the key point: "Recent advances in our knowledge of heredity have revolutionized the methods of agriculturalists in improving domesticated plants and animals. It was early recognized that this new knowledge would have a far-reaching influence upon certain problems of human society -- the problems of the unsocial classes, of immigration, of population, of effectiveness, of health and vigor."⁴ In short order, eugenicists blithely extended Mendelism to account for such social phenomena as alcoholism, prostitution, criminality, shiftlessness, and even poverty. All such traits, in these analyses, were attributed to dominant or recessive Mendelian characters. Reinforcing the genetical assessments of social inadequacy were the new efforts of psychologists to quantify mental capacity. Beginning with the attempts of such psychologists as Harry Goddard at the Vineland Training School in New Jersey to test varieties of feeble-mindedness, mental testers rapidly extended their scope beyond the feeble-minded to include normal human beings. Before World War I, English and American psychologists, including Charles Spearman, William McDougall, Lewis Terman, Robert Yerkes as well as Goddard developed what their profession regarded as reliable techniques for measuring human intelligence. With virtual inevitability, the test data was incorporated in eugenic doctrine to support,

quantitatively, the claim that feeble-mindedness or high intelligence were genetically determined traits.⁵

Convinced of the hereditary basis of social defect, British and American eugenicists were decidedly disturbed to note what was commonly referred to as the "differential birth rate" -- the tendency of the "better" classes in the two countries to have fewer children than families of the poor, the unintelligent, and the less able. Concern for the differential birth-rate added a dynamic element to eugenic social assessments, for it implied that British and American society were both suffering from "national deterioration." In the view of eugenicists, the general fiber of their respective societies -- the overall moral character, intelligence, energy, ambition, and capacity to compete in the world -- was declining. As evidence of national decline, British and American eugenicists pointed to the growth of big city slums; the alarming frequency of prostitution, alcoholism, and criminality; the mounting degree of social services needed to care for "mental defectives."

Yet there were key differences between the British and American anxieties over national deterioration. While American eugenicists worried about the proliferation of native defectives, they were bothered much more by the flood of immigrants to their shores from eastern and southeastern Europe. In contrast, while British eugenicists talked of the loss of able Englanders to the colonies and of the influx of immigrants, they stressed the threat to national fiber arising from the differential birth rate. No less important, American eugenicists mainly feared the new immigrant groups,

who were largely not white Anglo-Saxon Protestants, as internal threats to native American culture and society. In contrast, British eugenicists emphasized the danger of weakening their nation's competitive abilities with respect to other nations, particularly France and Germany. Among the most widely cited pieces of data in British eugenic circles was the alleged physical inadequacy of British Army recruits in Manchester during the Boer War.

In Britain, as a result, an important wing of the eugenics movement was exemplified by Karl Pearson, the Galton Professor of Eugenics at University College London. An advocate of the view that the ultimate aim of Darwinian natural selection was the survival of the group rather than the individual, Pearson liked to speak of "national eugenics"; to his mind, the proper aim of eugenics was to strengthen the competitive abilities of the national group. Of course for Pearsonians, Britain was to dominate not only the white nations across the English Channel but also the colored nations in the Empire. Still, while racism was implicit in British eugenics, it did not play an overtly important role; British society was on the whole racially homogeneous, save, in the British view, for the Irish. In America, however, with its substantial numbers of blacks and of immigrants assumed to be racially different, assumptions of genetic differences between WASPs and non-WASPs played a significant role in eugenic thinking.

Whatever their relative degrees of racism, both British and American eugenicists insisted that substantial improvements in their societies could be -- indeed, had to be -- brought about by the

manipulation of human breeding practices. With the aim of propagandizing this view, British eugenicists in 1907 formed the Eugenics Education Society -- later the Eugenics Society -- and in the United States in 1906 their counterparts formed a Eugenics Section of the American Breeders Association. Offshoots of the national organizations were founded in Birmingham, Liverpool, Cambridge, Manchester, Glasgow, and Southampton; in St. Louis, Madison, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Utah, and San Francisco (as a section of the Commonwealth Club). Further to advance the eugenic case, British eugenicists published the Eugenics Review and Americans contributed to the Journal of Heredity. In addition, eugenic advocates contributed numerous articles on the subject to popular journals and magazines. In 1914, American journals carried more articles on eugenics than on the three questions of slums, tenements, and living standards combined.⁶

In the two decades bracketing World War I, eugenics commanded a growing following in the United States and Britain. Membership in the Eugenics Education Society rose to just over 700 in 1913, then fell off, and recovered to almost 800 by the end of the 1920s. The popularity of eugenics extended far beyond activists in the movements. In 1907 Karl Pearson exulted to Galton: "You would be amused to hear how general is now the use of your word Eugenics! I hear most respectable middle class matrons saying if children are weakly, 'Ah, that was not a eugenic marriage!'" In Brighton, a friend of Pearson lamented, a call for a meeting of eugenicists would bring out "all the neo-Malthusians, antivaccinationists, antivivisectionists, Christian Scientists, Theosophists, Mullerites (who have

strange ways of having a bath and of breathing deep breaths), vegetarians, and the rest! Poor Sir Francis Galton. . . ." In London before the war, an enterprising young pregnant woman took herself to plays and concerts, conversed with H. G. Wells and other writers in the interest of giving birth to a eugenically desirable child. When "Eugenette Bolce" was born in 1913, she was widely hailed as England's first eugenic baby.

In the United States, eugenics was as much a part of the 1920s as the Einstein craze or Bruce Barton's Jesus, whom he made out to have been the world's first advertising man. Following suit, the eugenic publicist William Wiggam declared: "Had Jesus been among us he would have been president of the first Eugenics Congress."⁸ In the 1920s, too, intelligence testing became part of the pop-science vogue. During World War I American psychologists had devised a special set of tests to help sort recruits in the American Army. After the war, eugenic analysts studied the resulting data and concluded: blacks and non-WASPs scored lower than native WASPs. In the 1920s, numerous popular articles cited the Army tests as having provided scientific proof that non-WASPs were genetically less intelligent and capable.

The class and race-bound rhetoric of the eugenicists on both sides of the Atlantic has led students of the movements to identify them as essentially conservative, or, considering Pearson's national eugenics and the later Nazi perversion of the movement, to perceive eugenicists as protofascists. Yet however conservative and, in some cases, protofascist they were, it is important not to overlook

the degree to which the British and American eugenics movements, at least before World War I, both included social reformers -- progressives in the United States, liberals in England, and socialists in both countries. Before 1914 Harold Laski, Beatrice and Sidney Webb, George Bernard Shaw and J. B. S. Haldane, not to mention Pearson, an avowed socialist, were all advocates of eugenics in varying degrees. So were David Starr Jordan, Charles R. Van Hise, the reform sociologist Charles R. Henderson, Charles W. Eliot, and Gifford Pinchot. Like reform movements of the day in general, eugenics also drew heavily from women, social workers, and the professional middle class, particularly physicians, clerics, teachers, and life scientists. In both the United States and Britain, the eugenic ranks included, with varying degrees of sympathy, numerous respected geneticists, among them C. C. Hurst, R. A. Fisher, E. B. Poulton, Edward M. East, William E. Castle, and Edwin Grant Conklin, not to mention Davenport and Pearson.

To a considerable extent, the eugenics movements in Britain and America may be interpreted as middle class attempts at self-assertion, through a command of allegedly scientific expertise, in societies undergoing rapid industrial change. In this view, eugenics served the purpose in both countries of providing middle class Englishmen and Americans the means to carve out a locus of power for themselves between the new industrial capitalists, whom they resented, and the lower income groups, whom they feared.⁹ Yet at the same time, the American eugenics movement included a significant number of well-to-do, rather than rich, old stock Americans, while the British movement failed to attract members of the hereditary aristocracy. It

may have been that the British aristocracy was sufficiently secure in its standing as an aristocracy as such not to suffer the status anxieties which made the old stock American Harry Laughlin one of the most outspoken racists and restrictionists in the American eugenic leadership.

Whatever brought them to the movement, British and American eugenicists generally agreed upon a two-fold course of action: First, a program of "positive" eugenics, which meant encouraging "better" people to reproduce themselves at a higher rate. Second, a program of "negative" eugenics, which meant encouraging -- some preferred coercing -- "worse" people to proliferate more slowly. Neither in the United States nor in Britain did eugenicists find a practical way to urge better people to greater levels of procreation. As for negative eugenics, in the beginning its British advocates tended to take the position of the Eugenics Education Society: "It is not at present [1907] the policy of the Society to advocate interference by the State."¹⁰ But in due course, British eugenicists and their American counterparts began invoking the aid of government for a negative eugenic program -- principally through restrictions on marriage, segregation and sterilization of the feeble-minded, and immigration restriction.

In America after the turn of the century, various states passed eugenic marriage laws, which imposed restrictions on marriages for alcoholics, syphilitics, and epileptics, as well as the feeble-minded and the insane. Laws authorizing the sterilization of the feeble-minded were passed by sixteen states between 1907 and 1917,

by 14 more between 1916 and 1931. By 1935 some 20,000 sterilizations, 10,000 of them in California, had been legally performed in the United States.¹¹ Whether Britain passed eugenic marriage laws is not clear, but eugenicists there did lobby strongly for compulsory segregation and sterilization of the feeble-minded. Yet when the Mental Deficiency Control bill passed in 1913, following the denunciation of "eugenic cranks" on the floor of Parliament, both permanent segregation and compulsory sterilization were excluded. By the early 1930s sterilization of mental defectives remained illegal in Britain, and eugenic attempts to put a sterilization law on the books in that decade repeatedly failed. Perhaps public figures in Britain believed with J. B. S. Haldane that compulsory sterilization laws were merely a "piece of crude Americanism like the complete prohibition of alcoholic beverages."¹²

Comparatively few British eugenicists agitated for immigration restriction. In this period non-white immigration to Britain from the Empire was highly limited, though immigration from eastern Europe, consisting heavily of Jews, had been heavy enough since the 1880s to provoke discontent and the passage of the Aliens Act in 1905. In the 1920s Karl Pearson studied immigrant Jews in the East End of London. He found that, while equally intelligent as gentile Britons, they were shorter and dirtier; he proposed to restrict immigration on the basis of physical stature.¹³ Nothing came of Pearson's recommendation, but in the United States eugenicists played a significant role, together with organized labor and other interest groups, in bringing about the immigration restriction laws of the early 1920s.

These laws, of course, were aimed at preventing further "swamping" of the American population by foreigners from eastern and southeastern Europe, which meant mainly Jews and Catholics, and they established immigration formulas which had precisely the desired effect.

Marriage laws, sterilization, immigration restriction -- why did American eugenicists manage to write so much more of their negative eugenic program into law than did their British counterparts?¹⁴ To answer that question would require the substantial part of a book, but let me here in the brief space available suggest some of the topics such a book might cover. First, to state the obvious about immigration restriction, in the United States, where there were immigrants, immigration was an issue, while in Britain, where there were relatively few, it was not. Second, while issues of marriage laws and sterilization were matters of national policy in Britain, they were the concern of the states in America. Hence, in the United States advocates of eugenic marriage laws and sterilization had 48 chances to succeed; in Britain, only one. Moreover, the level of debate and discussion of the issues was no doubt rather lower in the typical state legislature of the day than it would have been in the British Parliament. Third, it seems likely that eugenic advocates in America could marshal considerably more scientific expertise for their cause than could their counterparts in Great Britain.

Doubtless the growth of higher education in the United States made many "experts" with some training in genetics available to American eugenicists. In a similar fashion, the large number of institutions of higher education in America offered state and legislative commissions a ready supply of faculty psychological and

biological witnesses. Above all, the Eugenics Record Office that Charles B. Davenport inaugurated at Cold Spring Harbor was a rich and growing storehouse of data concerning mental defectives and social deviates.¹⁵ In 1913 Davenport's associates founded the Eugenics Research Association, a conference where eugenic field workers could discuss their work. And in 1916 Davenport and Laughlin founded the Eugenical News, a newsletter clearinghouse for the activities of the Eugenics Record Office and its associates. Davenport and his allies trained numerous eugenic field workers who, their training finished, spread through numerous states and acted as expert sources of knowledge and advice for policy concerning marriage and sterilization laws.

In Britain, the supply of people trained in genetics and psychology, whether professors or educated laymen, was considerably smaller than in the United States. And the number of British universities was of course minuscule compared to the flourishing academic enterprise in America. While Galton established a Eugenics Record Office at University College London early in the century, the task of the office was to gather information concerning positive rather than negative eugenics. In any case, the office was soon absorbed in Karl Pearson's shop at University College. And Pearson, who was that country's most prominent scientific eugenicist and who commanded more resources for eugenics research than any other person in England, adamantly refused either to join the Eugenics Education Society, to participate in political activity, or to make available his institutional resources and expertise for the support of legislative measures.

George Bernard Shaw, who knew him through their mutual interest in Fabian socialism, once admonished Pearson: "You are full of reasons for doing nothing, all excellent reasons -- reasons for not making speeches in Trafalgar Square, for not writing plays, for not printing them, reasons for not living, not loving, not working, not having children -- an infinity of nots."¹⁶ However exaggerated, Shaw's criticism did catch an important aspect of Pearson's personality. By temperament, he was simply not a joiner. To his mind, it was better to pursue eugenics research, ferret out the facts in a rigorous fashion, and let others worry about the messy business of politics. Pearson unrelentingly refused to join the Eugenics Education Society because many of its members were laymen whose knowledge of hereditary science was rudimentary to say the least. Pearson, a hard, tough professional, regarded such people as unworthy of his collegueship. Besides, in Britain as in America, most members of the organized eugenics movement were Mendelians. Pearson, a fierce opponent of Mendelism, was of course a biometrician. For Pearson to have cooperated with the bulk of the eugenics movement would have been to join forces with what he regarded as a mushy-minded, scientifically wrong-headed enemy.

"I have always thought," the British eugenicist and geneticist R. Ruggles Gates remarked in 1931, "that the chief strength of the eugenic movement in America depended on the fact that they had a Research Institute [the Eugenics Record Office] connected with it."¹⁷ The chief weakness of the British eugenics movement was perhaps that it did not.

From the beginning, in both Britain and America, the eugenics

movement drew its critics, and the more vociferous and popular eugenicists became, the more intense grew the dissent. Even before World War I, social reformers and social workers, particularly those like staff in settlement houses or homes for the mentally ill, questioned the sweepingly genetical doctrine of the eugenicists. Increasingly the antieugenic argument was made that environment played a significant role in social behavior. In England by the 1920s Harold Laski had lost his eugenic ardor, and Beatrice Webb insisted to Karl Pearson: "I quite agree . . . that Eugenics is ultimately far more important than alterations in social environment, but in my opinion, until we get these alterations in social environment, we shall not get a chance of promoting Eugenics. Changes in social environment appeal to the common man, whereas Eugenics is intensely repulsive. . . ." In the United States one of the most telling reformist critiques of eugenics came from Clarence Darrow, who warned against vesting the state with eugenic powers. "Those in power," Darrow predicted, "would inevitably direct human breeding in their own interests. At the present time it would mean that big business would create a race in its own image. At any time, it would mean with men, as it does with animals, that breeding would be controlled for the use and purpose of the powerful and the unintelligent."¹⁸

Catholic spokesmen such as G. K. Chesterton repeatedly attacked eugenics, and in 1930 it was denounced by the Pope himself, along with contraception, sex education, and sterilization. While in the United States and Britain the eugenics movement included some Jews, on the whole the Jewish community in both countries tended to

oppose it as well. (That fact was a bit puzzling to the American zoologist and eugenicist Samuel J. Holmes, since, as he wrote, "no one can accuse the Jews as a stock of being deficient in native endowment of brains.")¹⁹ And among the more authoritative critics of eugenics, particularly after World War I, were many prominent American and British biologists.

Like reformers, many scientists such as Thomas Hunt Morgan recoiled at eugenics because of its outright racism, but not less important in the scientific dissent was the scientific wildness of much eugenic writing. The American geneticist Raymond Pearl, a staunch eugenicist before 1914 and an opponent of it by the 1920s, stressed that William Johannsen's pure-line experiments, which demonstrated that selection could not breed beyond a fixed maximum for a given characteristic, rendered impossible any program of positive eugenics. Reginald C. Punnett, the professor of genetics at Cambridge University, calculated that, since selection was ineffective when acting against a rare recessive such as mental defectiveness, deleterious recessives simply could not be eliminated from human populations in a few generations. William Bateson, who doubted that mental defectiveness was generally a Mendelian recessive at all, simply refused in the 1920s to have anything to do with the eugenics movement. The increasingly dominant opinion among British and American biologists was advanced by the Johns Hopkins geneticist Herbert S. Jennings, who attacked the construction of so much eugenic doctrine upon a foundation of genetical theory that derived from plants and non-human animals. "When the biologist from his knowledge of other organisms," Jennings declared,

"is tempted to dogmatize concerning the possibilities of human development, let him first ask himself: How correctly could I predict the behavior and social organization of ants from a knowledge of the natural history of the oyster?"²⁰

Yet while Pearl, Jennings, Morgan, Bateson, and others may have put considerable distance between themselves and eugenics by the 1920s, it would be wrong to conclude that eugenics lost all of its respected scientific advocates. It did not. Eugenics continued to command the support of the Americans Edward M. East and William C. Castle and of the British scientists C. C. Hurst, Ronald A. Fisher, R. Ruggles Gates, and, quite vociferously, Julian Huxley. Indeed, early in the depression, Huxley and others pointed to the rise of unemployment and the general national malaise as evidence of the ongoing need for a eugenic program. Britain and America, in the pre-Hitler depression were charged with having followed policies which were simply much too dysgenic. Not until the advent of Hitler and the inauguration of his brutal racial policies did most geneticists fall sharply away from eugenics. Even then, such geneticists as Gates and Davenport continued to uphold a brand of eugenics that critics called racist.

Indeed, if Nazism killed the initial eugenics movement, it did not put an end to eugenic thinking as such. During the 1930s, the British Eugenics Society and its American equivalent remained active while modifying their programs. Still intent upon improving the race through breeding, eugenicists stressed limiting family size and, by extension, population through the dissemination of birth control

information. Some eugenicists became strong advocates of the right of abortion. In the United States, the American Eugenics Society urged that, in the interest of encouraging the better sort of people to procreate more, the society should see to it that people could count upon a secure economic future. In the interest of negative eugenics, the AES called for discouraging excessive births among lower income groups by eliminating the economic incentive for larger families, i.e. by enforcing child labor laws and passing laws for minimum wage.²¹ And in America to a degree but in England especially, eugenicists became strong advocates of placing their doctrine on a sounder footing by endorsing considerably more research into human heredity.

From the beginning, eugenics stimulated useful, if often wrongheaded and biased, work in human genetics; the work of Charles B. Davenport was notable in this respect. And in the 1930s, the growing eugenic interest in human genetics stimulated C. C. Hurst to attempt to found an Institute for Human Genetics and Ruggles Gates to establish a Bureau of Human Heredity in London. Thus, throughout its history to 1939, the eugenics movements in the United States and Britain had important functional effects upon the science to which they were closely related.²² The nature and degree of this impact has only begun to be understood. Like the comparative analysis of eugenics not only in Britain and America but in other countries, it is a field rich in research opportunities.

FOOTNOTES

1. The main works are: Mark H. Haller, Eugenics: Hereditarian Attitudes in American Thought (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1963); Donald K. Pickens, Eugenics and the Progressives (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968); Kenneth M. Ludmerer, Genetics and American Society (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972); Hamilton Cravens, The Triumph of Evolution: American Scientists and the Heredity-Environment Controversy, 1900-1914 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978); Lyndsay A. Farrall, The Origins and Growth of the English Eugenics Movement, 1865-1922 (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, Inc., 1970); G. R. Searle, Eugenics and Politics in Britain, 1900-1914 (Leyden: Noordhoff International Publishing, 1976); Donald MacKenzie, "Eugenics in Britain," Social Studies of Science, 6 (September 1976), 499-532; Geoffrey R. Searle, "Eugenics and Politics in the 1930s," 1977, forthcoming; Geoffrey R. Searle, "Eugenics and Class," The Roots of Sociobiology (London: Past and Present Society, 1978). A full review of the literature is forthcoming in: Lyndsay A. Farrall, "The History of Eugenics: A Bibliographical Review."

2. This is a work in progress towards a book and the ideas advanced herein must be read as tentative and suggestive.
3. Charles E. Rosenberg, "Heredity, Disease, and Social Thought in Nineteenth-Century America," Perspectives in American History, VIII (1974), 221-223, 228-9; Galton, "Eugenics: Its Definition, Scope, and Aims," 1901, copy in Francis Galton Papers, University College London Archives, List 138/9.
4. Charles B. Davenport, Heredity in Relation to Eugenics (New York: Henry Holt, 1911), p. iii.
5. Peter L. Tyor, "Morons, Mental Defect, and the Origins of Intelligence Testing," unpublished paper, 1977; Leon J. Kamin, The Science and Politics of I.Q. (Potomac, Md.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1974), p. 7.
6. John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925 (2nd ed.; New York: Atheneum, 1969), pp. 150-51.
7. Farrall, Eugenics, p. 211; Searle, "Eugenics and Politics in the 1930s," p. 2; Pearson to Galton, June 20, 1907, Karl Pearson Papers, University College London Archives, Cabinet VI, Drawer 6; R. J. Ryle to Pearson, Oct. 15, 1913, Pearson Papers, Cabinet IV, Drawer 7. Clippings concerning the "eugenic" baby are in Eugenics Cuttings Book, Pearson Papers.

8. Quoted in Clarence Darrow, "The Eugenics Cult," The American Mercury, 8 (June 1926), 137.
9. See, particularly, Searle, Eugenics and Politics, pp. 113-14; Paul Gary Wersky, "Haldane and Huxley: The First Appraisals," Journal of the History of Biology, IV (Spring 1971), 171-83; Ludmerer, Genetics and American Society, passim.
10. The Eugenics Education Society, "Prospectus," 1907, Karl Pearson Papers, Cabinet IV, Drawer 6.
11. Haller, Eugenics, pp. 133-37; Ludmerer, Genetics and American Society, p. 95.
12. Kathleen Jones, A History of the Mental Health Services (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), pp. 200-203, 208-209; Haldane is quoted in Searle, Eugenics and Politics, pp. 94-95; Searle argues that the eugenicists won more of a victory in the Mental Deficiency Act than Jones gives them credit for, but it is difficult to see how. For the status of sterilization in Britain by the 1930s, see "Eugenics Society," The Lancet, May 28, 1932, 1149-50, copy in R. Ruggles Gates Papers, Kings College London.
13. Searle, Eugenics and Politics, pp. 39-40.

14. Ludmerer, Genetics and Society, p. 156 takes up this point, but his evidence is skimpy and his argument, hence, unpersuasive.
15. Davenport designed the Eugenics Record Office to "include the training of field workers, the analysis of the large amount of data which is being accumulated by this office and the giving of occasional lectures before societies of physicians, social workers and those interested in the application of eugenics to town and state affairs." Davenport to H. S. Jennings, May 6, 1912, Charles B. Davenport Papers, American Philosophical Society, Jennings file.
16. Shaw to Pearson, June 20, 1893, Pearson Papers, List 627
17. Gates to C. C. Hurst, July 1, 1931, C. C. Hurst Papers, Cambridge University Library, Add 7955/18/62.
18. Webb to Pearson, Oct. 2, 1930, Pearson Papers, Cabinet IV, Drawer 9; Darrow, "The Eugenics Cult," The American Mercury, 8 (June 1926), 137. See also the earlier critique of Sidney Webb, who admonished Pearson: "No doubt, in past decades, we have all of us talked loosely (and as we now realize inaccurately) about race deterioration through adverse social conditions. But that does not imply that there is not ample reason for removing social conditions which are adverse to the proper development of each generation when born. Even assuming that semi-starvation in

childhood, parental neglect, slum life, street trading and existence as a casual laborer do not in any way affect the germ plasm -- well, is that any reason for not remedying such evil influences? We don't live merely for posterity." Webb to Pearson, Nov. 16, 1909, Pearson Papers, Cabinet IV, Drawer 6. Mary Dendy, a social worker and eugenicist who worked with the feeble-minded, pointed out to Pearson apropos the use of mental tests that people could be dull at lessons yet be useful and sensible members of society. Dendy to Pearson, Oct. 26, 1913, Pearson Papers, Cabinet IV, Drawer 8.

19. Samuel J. Holmes, The Eugenic Predicament (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1933), p. 122.
20. See Thomas Hunt Morgan to Charles B. Davenport, Jan. 18, 1918, Davenport Papers, Morgan file; Raymond Pearl, "The Biology of Superiority," The American Mercury, 12 (November 1927), 257-66; William B. Provine, The Origin of Theoretical Population Genetics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 139; Bateson to Hurst, Oct. 19, 1911 and March 2, 1912, Hurst Papers, Add 7955/11/7; Add 7955/12/1; Jennings is quoted in Darrow, "The Eugenics Cult," pp. 132-3.
21. See Searle, "Eugenics and Politics in the 1930s," p. 6; Ellsworth Huntington, Tomorrow's Children: The Goal of Eugenics (New York: John Wiley, 1935); C. P. Blacker, Eugenics: Galton and After (London: Duckworth, 1952), pp. 129ff.

22. See discussion of the proposed institute of human genetics, "Report of a Meeting at London School of Economics, July 1931," Hurst Papers, Add 7955/18/189. For exemplary works on the role of eugenics in fostering human and other genetics, see: Charles E. Rosenberg, "Charles Benedict Davenport and the Beginning of Human Genetics," Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 35 (1961), 266-76; Bernard Norton, "Karl Pearson and Statistics: The Social Origins of Scientific Innovation"; Donald MacKenzie, "Statistical Theory and Social Interests: A Case Study," Social Studies of Science, (8 Feb. 1978), 3-34, 35-84; Ruth Schwartz Cowan, "Francis Galton's Statistical Ideas: The Influence of Eugenics," Isis, 63 (1972), 509-28. Clippings concerning the Bureau of Heredity are in the Gates Papers, Kings College London Library.