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Bayesian consistent belief selection

Chambers, Christopher P. and Hayashi, Takashi (2010) Bayesian consistent belief selection. Journal of Economic Theory, 145 (1). pp. 432-439. ISSN 0022-0531.

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A subjective expected utility agent is given information about the state of the world in the form of a set of possible priors. She is assumed to form her beliefs given this information. A set of priors may be updated according to Bayes' rule, prior-by-prior, upon learning that some state of the world has not obtained. In a model in which information is completely summarized by this set of priors, we show that there exists no decision maker who obeys Bayes' rule, conditions her prior only on the available information (by selecting a belief in the announced set), and who updates the information prior-by-prior using Bayes' rule.

Item Type:Article
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Chambers, Christopher P.0000-0001-8253-0328
Additional Information:© 2009 Elsevier Inc. Received 14 January 2008; final version received 2 September 2008; accepted 15 July 2009. Available online 29 July 2009. The authors would like to thank Kim Border, Federico Echenique, Larry Epstein, Bart Lipman, Max Stinchcombe, John Quiggin, and Bill Zame for helpful discussions and comments. The associate editor and two anonymous referees also provided comments which were very helpful. All errors are our own.
Issue or Number:1
Classification Code:JEL classification: D81.
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20100316-092521312
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:17747
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:22 Mar 2010 02:41
Last Modified:09 Mar 2020 13:18

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