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An experimental study of auctions versus grandfathering to assign pollution permits

Goeree, Jacob K. and Palmer, Karen and Holt, Charles A. and Shobe, William and Burtraw, Dallas (2010) An experimental study of auctions versus grandfathering to assign pollution permits. Journal of the European Economic Association, 8 (2-3). pp. 514-525. ISSN 1542-4766. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20100527-080512124

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Abstract

We experimentally study auctions versus grandfathering in the initial assignment of pollution permits that can be traded in a secondary spot market. Low and high emitters compete for permits in the auction, whereas permits are assigned for free under grandfathering. In theory, trading in the spot market should erase inefficiencies due to initial mis-allocations. In the experiment, high emitters exercise market power in the spot market, and permit holdings under grandfathering remain skewed towards high emitters. Furthermore, the opportunity costs of “free” permits are fully “passed through.” In the auction, the majority of permits arewon by low emitters, reducing the need for spot-market trading. Auctions generate higher consumer surplus and slightly lower product prices in the laboratory markets. Moreover, auctions eliminate the large “windfall profits” that are observed in the treatment with free, grandfathered permit allocations.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/jeea.2010.8.2-3.514PublisherArticle
http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jeea.2010.8.2-3.514DOIArticle
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Goeree, Jacob K.0000-0001-9876-3425
Additional Information:© 2010 by the European Economic Association. The editor in charge of this paper was Stefano DelaVigna. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Dutch National Science Foundation (VICI 453.03.606), the Bankard Fund for Political Economy, Mistra’s Climate Policy Research Forum (Clipore) and the US Environmental Protection Agency. We would like to thank Helen Bernhard, Noemi Nagi, Thomas Neumeyer, Nina Spiri, and Sean Sullivan for their help with the experiments, and participants at the European Economic Association Meetings (Barcelona, August 2009) for useful comments.
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (NWO)VICI 453.03.606
Bankard Fund for Political EconomyUNSPECIFIED
Mistra’s Climate Policy Research Forum (Clipore)UNSPECIFIED
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)UNSPECIFIED
Issue or Number:2-3
Classification Code:JEL: C92, D43, D44, Q58
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20100527-080512124
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20100527-080512124
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:18470
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:23 Jun 2010 18:33
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 01:43

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