Echenique, Federico (2004) Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities. Games and Economic Behavior, 46 (2). pp. 348-364. ISSN 0899-8256. doi:10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00122-2. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20100929-155427372
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Abstract
I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a nonempty, complete lattice—in particular, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria exist. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of fixed points of a correspondence. My results are limited because extensive-form games of strategic complementarities turn out—surprisingly—to be a very restrictive class of games.
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| Additional Information: | © 2003 Elsevier Inc. Received 9 December 2001. Available online 21 November 2003. This paper is a revised version of Chapter 2 in my PhD dissertation at U.C. Berkeley. I am very grateful to my advisers, Ilya Segal, and Chris Shannon, for many helpful discussions. I also thank Bob Anderson, Rabah Amir, and Matthew Rabin for their comments. The paper is better thanks to the thoughtful comments of two anonymous referees. | ||||||
| Subject Keywords: | Strategic complementarities; Supermodular games; Subgame-perfect equilibrium; Dynamic games; Tarski's fixed point theorem | ||||||
| Issue or Number: | 2 | ||||||
| Classification Code: | JEL classification codes: C72; C73 | ||||||
| DOI: | 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00122-2 | ||||||
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20100929-155427372 | ||||||
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20100929-155427372 | ||||||
| Official Citation: | Federico Echenique, Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 46, Issue 2, February 2004, Pages 348-364, ISSN 0899-8256, DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00122-2. (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-49BS9RM-7/2/717d88f55ddb3cfad1f06b569a63ac41) | ||||||
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||
| ID Code: | 20229 | ||||||
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||
| Deposited By: | Katherine Johnson | ||||||
| Deposited On: | 30 Sep 2010 16:57 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 08 Nov 2021 23:58 |
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