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Contracts vs. Salaries in Matching

Echenique, Federico (2010) Contracts vs. Salaries in Matching. Social Science Working Paper, 1322. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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Firms and workers may sign complex contracts that govern many aspects of their interactions. I show that when firms regard contracts as substitutes, bargaining over contracts can be understood as bargaining only over wages. Substitutes is the assumption commonly used to guarantee the existence of stable matchings of workers and firms.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ItemLater version published in American Economic Review
Echenique, Federico0000-0002-1567-6770
Additional Information:I thank Vince Crawford, Flip Klijn, Scott Kominers, and Michael Ostrovsky for very useful comments. I am also very grateful to three anonymous referees for their thoughtful questions and suggestions.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:Contracts, Substitutes, Gross Substitutes, Stable Matching
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1322
Classification Code:JEL classication: C78
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20101008-093110872
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:20348
Deposited By: Katherine Johnson
Deposited On:08 Oct 2010 16:39
Last Modified:26 Nov 2019 11:15

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