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Aggregate Matchings

Echenique, Federico and Lee, Sangmok and Shum, Matthew (2010) Aggregate Matchings. Social Science Working Paper, 1316. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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This paper characterizes the testable implications of stability for aggregate matchings. We consider data on matchings where individuals are aggregated, based on their observable characteristics, into types, and we know how many agents of each type match. We derive stability conditions for an aggregate matching, and, based on these, provide a simple necessary and sufficient condition for an observed aggregate matching to be rationalizable (i.e. such that preferences can be found so that the observed aggregate matching is stable). Subsequently, we derive moment inequalities based on the stability conditions, and provide an empirical illustration using the cross-sectional marriage distributions across the US states.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Echenique, Federico0000-0002-1567-6770
Shum, Matthew0000-0002-6262-915X
Additional Information:Echenique thanks the Lee Center at Caltech, and the NSF, for funding related to this project. We also thank Pierre-Andre Chiappori, Aureo de Paula, Bernard Salanie, Leeat Yariv, and seminar participants at Boston College, Universitat Aut`onoma de Barcelona, Universidad de Vigo, UCLA, the 2010 CAPCP conference at Penn State, the Roth-Sotomayor Celebration in Duke University, and the 2010 Cowles Summer Conference at Yale, for helpful comments. Supplemental material includes 99 slides for the NBER Market Design Conference (Oct. 8, 2010)
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Caltech Lee Center for Advanced NetworkingUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Stable Matching, Testable Implications, Partial Identification, Aggregate Matchings, Marriage
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1316
Classification Code:JEL classification: C78
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20101008-101034676
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:20351
Deposited By: Katherine Johnson
Deposited On:08 Oct 2010 17:23
Last Modified:26 Nov 2019 11:15

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