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Hierarchical package bidding: A paper & pencil combinatorial auction

Goeree, Jacob K. and Holt, Charles A. (2010) Hierarchical package bidding: A paper & pencil combinatorial auction. Games and Economic Behavior, 70 (1). pp. 146-169. ISSN 0899-8256.

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We introduce a new combinatorial auction format based on a simple, transparent pricing mechanism tailored for the hierarchical package structure proposed by Rothkopf, Pekeč, and Harstad to avoid computational complexity [Rothkopf, M., Pekeč, A., Harstad, R., 1998, Computationally manageable combinatorial auctions. Manage. Sci. 44, 1131–1147]. This combination provides the feedback necessary for bidders in multi-round auctions to discern winning bidding strategies for subsequent rounds and to coordinate responses to aggressive package bids. The resulting mechanism is compared to two leading alternatives in a series of laboratory experiments involving varying degrees of value synergies. Based on these “wind tunnel” tests the FCC has decided to use hierarchical package bidding in a segment of the upcoming 700 MHz auction.

Item Type:Article
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URLURL TypeDescription
Goeree, Jacob K.0000-0001-9876-3425
Additional Information:© 2008 Elsevier Inc. Received 24 December 2007, Available online 3 April 2008. We acknowledge partial financial support from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC contract 05000012), the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, the Gates Grubstake Fund, the National Science Foundation (SBR 0551014), and the Dutch National Science Foundation (NWO-VICI 453.03.606).
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Federal Communications Commission05000012
Alfred P. Sloan FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Gordon and Betty Moore FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Gates Grubstake FundUNSPECIFIED
Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (NWO)NWO-VICI 453.03.606
Subject Keywords:FCC spectrum auctions; Package bidding; Experiments
Issue or Number:1
Classification Code:JEL classification codes: D44; C92
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20110119-085136788
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Official Citation:Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt, Hierarchical package bidding: A paper & pencil combinatorial auction, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 70, Issue 1, Special Issue In Honor of Ehud Kalai, September 2010, Pages 146-169, ISSN 0899-8256, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.013. (
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:21804
Deposited By: Benjamin Perez
Deposited On:19 Jan 2011 18:03
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 02:29

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