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When Does "Economic Man" Dominate Social Behavior?

Camerer, Colin F. and Fehr, Ernst (2006) When Does "Economic Man" Dominate Social Behavior? Science, 311 (5757). pp. 47-52. ISSN 0036-8075. doi:10.1126/science.1110600. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110203-152805960

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Abstract

The canonical model in economics considers people to be rational and self-regarding. However, much evidence challenges this view, raising the question of when “Economic Man” dominates the outcome of social interactions, and when bounded rationality or other-regarding preferences dominate. Here we show that strategic incentives are the key to answering this question. A minority of self-regarding individuals can trigger a “noncooperative” aggregate outcome if their behavior generates incentives for the majority of other-regarding individuals to mimic the minority's behavior. Likewise, a minority of other-regarding individuals can generate a “cooperative” aggregate outcome if their behavior generates incentives for a majority of self-regarding people to behave cooperatively. Similarly, in strategic games, aggregate outcomes can be either far from or close to Nash equilibrium if players with high degrees of strategic thinking mimic or erase the effects of others who do very little strategic thinking. Recently developed theories of other-regarding preferences and bounded rationality explain these findings and provide better predictions of actual aggregate behavior than does traditional economic theory.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1110600 DOIArticle
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Camerer, Colin F.0000-0003-4049-1871
Additional Information:© 2006 American Association for the Advancement of Science.
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Human Frontier Science ProgramUNSPECIFIED
NSFSES-000376
University of ZurichUNSPECIFIED
Collegium HelveticumUNSPECIFIED
Issue or Number:5757
DOI:10.1126/science.1110600
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20110203-152805960
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110203-152805960
Official Citation:Camerer, C. F. and E. Fehr (2006). "When Does "Economic Man" Dominate Social Behavior?" Science 311(5757): 47-52.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:21991
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:14 Feb 2011 19:39
Last Modified:09 Nov 2021 16:02

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