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Behavioral game theory: Plausible formal models that predict accurately

Camerer, Colin F. (2003) Behavioral game theory: Plausible formal models that predict accurately. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 26 (2). pp. 157-158. ISSN 0140-525X. doi:10.1017/S0140525X03260052.

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Many weaknesses of game theory are cured by new models that embody simple cognitive principles, while maintaining the formalism and generality that makes game theory useful. Social preference models can generate team reasoning by combining reciprocation and correlated equilibrium. Models of limited iterated thinking explain data better than equilibrium models do; and they self-repair problems of implausibility and multiplicity of equilibria.

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Camerer, Colin F.0000-0003-4049-1871
Additional Information:© 2003 Cambridge University Press.
Issue or Number:2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20110210-111548195
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:22110
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:10 Mar 2011 22:56
Last Modified:09 Nov 2021 16:03

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