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Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners

Camerer, Colin F. and Thaler, Richard H. (1995) Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9 (2). pp. 209-219. ISSN 0895-3309.

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Economics can be distinguished from other social sciences by the belief that most (all?) behavior can be explained by assuming that agents have stable, well-defined preferences and make rational choices consistent with those preferences in markets that (eventually) clear. An empirical result qualifies as an anomaly if it is difficult to "rationalize" or if implausible assumptions are necessary to explain it within the paradigm. This column will resume, after a long rest, the investigation of such anomalies.

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Camerer, Colin F.0000-0003-4049-1871
Additional Information:© 1995 American Economic Association. We would like to thank Ernst Fehr, John Kagel, Al Roth, Vernon Smith, Richard Zeckhauser and, as always, the editors for helpful comments. None should be blamed if we have been unfair or rude.
Issue or Number:2
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Official Citation:Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners Colin Camerer and Richard H. Thaler The Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring, 1995), pp. 209-219 Published by: American Economic Association Article Stable URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:22127
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:11 Feb 2011 23:22
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 02:34

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