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Outside Options and Social Comparison in Three-Player Ultimatum Game Experiments

Knez, Marc J. and Camerer, Colin F. (1995) Outside Options and Social Comparison in Three-Player Ultimatum Game Experiments. Games and Economic Behavior, 10 (1). pp. 65-94. ISSN 0899-8256. doi:10.1006/game.1995.1025.

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We conducted ultimatum games in which a proposer offers a division of $10 to a respondent, who accepts or rejects it. If an offer is rejected, players receive a known outside option. Our proposers made simultaneous offers to two respondents, with outside options of $2 and $4. The rate of rejected offers was higher than in similar studies, around 50%, and persisted across five trials. Outside options seem to make players "egocentrically" apply different interpretations of the amount being divided, which creates persistent disagreement. And half of respondents demand more when they know other respondents are being offered more.

Item Type:Article
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Camerer, Colin F.0000-0003-4049-1871
Additional Information:© 1995 Academic Press. Received July 15, 1994. Available online 24 April 2002. We thank participants in the Social Organization of Competition Workshop (Univ. of Chicago) and in the Behavioral Decision Research in Management Conference (Boston, May 1994) and the referees and the special issue editor Tom Palfrey for extremely helpful comments.
Issue or Number:1
Classification Code:JEL Classification Numbers: 026, 215.
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20110211-091232218
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Official Citation:Knez Marc J., Camerer Colin F., Outside Options and Social Comparison in Three-Player Ultimatum Game Experiments, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 10, Issue 1, July 1995, Pages 65-94, ISSN 0899-8256, DOI: 10.1006/game.1995.1025. (
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:22128
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:11 Feb 2011 23:04
Last Modified:09 Nov 2021 16:03

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