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Creating Expectational Assets in the Laboratory: Coordination in 'Weakest- Link' Games

Knez, Marc and Camerer, Colin (1994) Creating Expectational Assets in the Laboratory: Coordination in 'Weakest- Link' Games. Strategic Management Journal, 15 (S1). pp. 101-119. ISSN 0143-2095. doi:10.1002/smj.4250150908.

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We study coordination games with multiple equilibria, in which players are penalized for picking numbers higher than the minimum anybody picks, and everyone prefers a larger minimum. 'Weakest-link' games like this model organizational situations in which the worst component of a product or process determines its overall quality. In experimental groups, the best equilibrium was reached infrequently. Aggregating two groups into a larger one always hurt. We argue that players' beliefs about what the minimum will be are an 'expectational asset' (or liability) which is socially complex, linking organization-level behavior and the resource-based view of the firm.

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Camerer, Colin0000-0003-4049-1871
Additional Information:© 1994 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Helpful comments were received from Ed Zajac and from participants in the lively working conference for this issue, held at the Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, June 1994.
Subject Keywords:Coordination, experimental economics, resource-based view, group norms
Issue or Number:S1
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20110211-095420093
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:22130
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:10 Mar 2011 20:58
Last Modified:09 Nov 2021 16:03

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