Camerer, Colin and Loewenstein, George and Weber, Martin (1989) The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis. Journal of Political Economy, 97 (5). pp. 1232-1254. ISSN 0022-3808. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110214-111401287
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Abstract
In economic analyses of asymmetric information, better-informed agents are assumed capable of reproducing the judgments of less-informed agents. We discuss a systematic violation of this assumption that we call the "curse of knowledge." Better-informed agents are unable to ignore private information even when it is in their interest to do so; more information is not always better. Comparing judgments made in individual-level and market experiments, we find that market forces reduce the curse by approximately 50 percent but do not eliminate it. Implications for bargaining, strategic behavior by firms, principal-agent problems, and choice under un-certainty are discussed.
| Item Type: | Article | ||||||
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| Additional Information: | © 1989 The University of Chicago. | ||||||
| Issue or Number: | 5 | ||||||
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20110214-111401287 | ||||||
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110214-111401287 | ||||||
| Official Citation: | The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein and Martin Weber The Journal of Political Economy Vol. 97, No. 5 (Oct., 1989), pp. 1232-1254 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1831894 | ||||||
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||
| ID Code: | 22171 | ||||||
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||
| Deposited By: | Tony Diaz | ||||||
| Deposited On: | 10 Mar 2011 23:36 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 03 Oct 2019 02:35 |
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