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Experimental Markets for Insurance

Camerer, Colin and Kunreuther, Howard (1989) Experimental Markets for Insurance. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2 (3). pp. 265-300. ISSN 0895-5646. doi:10.1007/BF00209390.

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This article extends the large amount of research on double-oral auction markets to hazards that produce only losses. We report results from a series of experiments in which subjects endowed with low-probability losses can pay a premium for insurance protection. Insurers specify the price at which they are willing to assume the risk of a loss. Insurance prices approach expected value for a large range of probabilities and loss amounts. Subjects seem to realize losses are statistically independent. Prices are not affected by ambiguity about the probability of loss.

Item Type:Article
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URLURL TypeDescription DOIArticle
Camerer, Colin0000-0003-4049-1871
Additional Information:© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Thanks to Michael Chernew, Marc Knez, Lisabeth Miller, and especially Peter Knez for research assistance, and to Jonathan Baron, Robyn Dawes, Robin Hogarth, Charles Plott and Uzi Segal for helpful comments. Useful suggestions were received from audiences at the Fourth Experimental Economics Conference (Tucson), the First Conference on Behavioral Decision Making (Cornell), ORSN TIMS (Miami), and seminars at Washington University and Carnegie-Mellon. This research was supported by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (grant #85-5-1), The National Science foundation (grant #SES87-08566), and the Wharton Risk and Decision Process Center.
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation85-5-1
Wharton Risk and Decision Processes CenterUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:insurance, experimental economics, prospect theory
Issue or Number:3
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20110215-144258866
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:22227
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:09 Mar 2011 22:44
Last Modified:09 Nov 2021 16:03

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