Camerer, Colin (1996) Rules for Experimenting in Psychology and Economics, and Why They Differ. In: Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten. Springer , New York, pp. 313-327. ISBN 9783540614906. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110223-145653645
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Abstract
This chapter discusses methodological differences in the way economists and psychologists typically conduct experiments. The main argument is that methodological differences spring from basic differences in the way knowledge is created and cumulated in the two fields- especially the important role of simple, formal theory in economics which is largely absent in psychology.
| Item Type: | Book Section | ||||||
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| Additional Information: | © 1996 Springer. Comments from participants at the Big Ten Accounting Doctoral Consortium, Minneapolis 5/13-15/94, Chip Heath, Wulf Albers, and Werner Güth, were helpful. Many conversations over the years - particularly with Daniel Kahneman, Charlie Plott, and Richard Thaler, and numerous coauthors - have shaped the contents of this paper. Discussions at the Russell Sage Foundation during my 1991-92 visit there were especially formative. | ||||||
| Subject Keywords: | Experimental economics, psychology, bounded rationality | ||||||
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20110223-145653645 | ||||||
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110223-145653645 | ||||||
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||
| ID Code: | 22461 | ||||||
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||
| Deposited By: | Tony Diaz | ||||||
| Deposited On: | 08 Mar 2011 23:06 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 03 Oct 2019 02:37 |
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