CaltechAUTHORS
  A Caltech Library Service

Poverty, politics, and preferences: Field experiments and survey data from Vietnam

Tanaka, Tomomi and Camerer, Colin F. and Nguyen, Quang (2006) Poverty, politics, and preferences: Field experiments and survey data from Vietnam. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110224-094646474

[img]
Preview
PDF - Submitted Version
See Usage Policy.

960Kb
[img]
Preview
PDF - Supplemental Material
See Usage Policy.

3699Kb

Use this Persistent URL to link to this item: http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110224-094646474

Abstract

We conducted field experiments to investigate how wealth, political history, occupation, and other demographic variables (from a comprehensive earlier household survey) are correlated with risk, time discounting and trust in Vietnam. Our experiments suggest risk and time preferences depend on the stage of economic development. In wealthier villages, people are less loss-averse and more patient. Our research also shows people who participate in ROSCAs (rotating credit associations) are more patient than non-participant, but those who participate in bidding ROSCAs are less patient and more risk averse than those who participate in fixed ROSCAs. Results from a trust game demonstrate both positive and negative effects of communism. Villagers in the South tend to invest more in low-income partners without expecting repayment. On the other hand, people in the north are more trustworthy but do not pass on more money to the poor. Our findings also suggest market activities, like starting a small trade business, are correlated with trust and trustworthiness. We also contribute to experimental methodology by using choices that separate different aspects of risk aversion and time preferences in behavioral economics specifications.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Camerer, Colin F.0000-0003-4049-1871
Classification Code:JEL keywords: C93, D81
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20110224-094646474
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110224-094646474
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:22469
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:10 Nov 2011 00:07
Last Modified:29 Nov 2017 06:08

Repository Staff Only: item control page