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Modularity and the Causal Markov Condition: A Restatement

Hausman, Daniel M. and Woodward, James (2004) Modularity and the Causal Markov Condition: A Restatement. British Journal for the Philisophy of Science, 55 (1). pp. 147-161. ISSN 0007-0882. doi:10.1093/bjps/55.1.147.

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Nancy Cartwright's comments ([2002]) expose some gaps and difficulties in the argument for the causal Markov condition in our essay ‘Independence, Invariance and the Causal Markov Condition’ ([1999]), and we are grateful for the opportunity to reformulate our position. In particular, Cartwright disagrees vigorously with many of the theses we advance about the connection between causation and manipulation. Although we are not persuaded by some of her criticisms, we shall confine ourselves to showing how our central argument can be reconstructed and to casting doubt on Cartwright's claim that the causal Markov condition typically fails when there are indeterministic by-products.

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Additional Information:© 2004 British Society for the Philosophy of Science. First published online: January 23, 2006. We are indebted to Nancy Cartwright and Clark Glymour for extensive criticisms of an earlier draft.
Issue or Number:1
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20111013-133003852
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Official Citation:Discussion: Daniel M. Hausman andJames Woodward Modularity and the Causal Markov Condition: A Restatement Br J Philos Sci (2004) 55(1): 147-161 doi:10.1093/bjps/55.1.147
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:27213
Deposited By: Ruth Sustaita
Deposited On:13 Oct 2011 21:18
Last Modified:10 May 2022 23:34

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