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Incentive effects: The case of belief elicitation from individuals in groups

Wang, Stephanie W. (2011) Incentive effects: The case of belief elicitation from individuals in groups. Economics Letters, 111 (1). pp. 30-33. ISSN 0165-1765. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20111018-081333167

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Abstract

Non-incentivized belief elicitation has a negative effect on the belief accuracy of experienced observers predicting choices in 2 × 2 matrix games. This negative impact extends to the accuracy of group beliefs and revised beliefs after forecasters know each other's initial beliefs.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.045 DOIUNSPECIFIED
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176510004180PublisherUNSPECIFIED
Additional Information:© 2010 Elsevier B.V. Received 7 September 2009; revised 18 November 2010; Accepted 24 November 2010. Available online 4 December 2010. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of The Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social Science. I thank Roland Benabou, Stephen Morris, Thomas Palfrey, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social Science UNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Belief elicitation; Incentives; Belief aggregation; Experiments
Issue or Number:1
Classification Code:JEL classification: C91; C72; D83
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20111018-081333167
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20111018-081333167
Official Citation:Stephanie W. Wang, Incentive effects: The case of belief elicitation from individuals in groups, Economics Letters, Volume 111, Issue 1, April 2011, Pages 30-33, ISSN 0165-1765, 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.045. (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176510004180)
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:27266
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Ruth Sustaita
Deposited On:18 Oct 2011 15:24
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 03:22

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