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Network architecture, salience and coordination

Choi, Syngjoo and Gale, Douglas and Kariv, Shachar and Palfrey, Thomas (2011) Network architecture, salience and coordination. Games and Economic Behavior, 73 (1). pp. 76-90. ISSN 0899-8256. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.001.

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This paper reports the results of an experimental investigation of dynamic games in networks. In each period, the subjects simultaneously choose whether or not to make an irreversible contribution to the provision of an indivisible public good. Subjects observe the past actions of other subjects if and only if they are connected by the network. Networks may be incomplete so subjects are asymmetrically informed about the actions of other subjects in the same network, which is typically an obstacle to the attainment of an efficient outcome. For all networks, the game has a large set of (possibly inefficient) equilibrium outcomes. Nonetheless, the network architecture makes certain strategies salient and this in turn facilitates coordination on efficient outcomes. In particular, asymmetries in the network architecture encourage two salient behaviors, strategic delay and strategic commitment. By contrast, we find that symmetries in the network architecture can lead to mis-coordination and inefficient outcomes.

Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
Palfrey, Thomas0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:© 2011 Elsevier Inc. Received 19 August 2009. Available online 20 January 2011. This research was supported by the Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social Science (PLESS) and the UC Berkeley Experimental Social Science Laboratory (Xlab). The paper has benefited from suggestions by the participants of seminars at several universities. We acknowledge the National Science Foundation for support under grants SBR-0095109 (Gale), SES-0617955 (Gale and Kariv), and SES-0617820 (Palfrey) and the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (Palfrey). Kariv is grateful for the hospitality of the School of Social Science in the Institute for Advanced Studies.
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social Science (PLESS)UNSPECIFIED
UC Berkeley Experimental Social Science Laboratory (Xlab)UNSPECIFIED
Gordon and Betty Moore FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Experiment; Monotone games; Networks; Coordination; Strategic commitment; Strategic delay
Issue or Number:1
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20120228-105149483
Persistent URL:
Official Citation:Syngjoo Choi, Douglas Gale, Shachar Kariv, Thomas Palfrey, Network architecture, salience and coordination, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 73, Issue 1, September 2011, Pages 76-90, ISSN 0899-8256, 10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.001.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:29504
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:28 Feb 2012 23:22
Last Modified:09 Nov 2021 17:07

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