Superselection rules and quantum protocols

Abstract

We show that superselection rules do not enhance the information-theoretic security of quantum cryptographic protocols. Our analysis employs two quite different methods. The first method uses the concept of a reference system—in a world subject to a superselection rule, unrestricted operations can be simulated by parties who share access to a reference system with suitable properties. By this method, we prove that if an n-party protocol is secure in a world subject to a superselection rule, then the security is maintained even if the superselection rule is relaxed. However, the proof applies only to a limited class of superselection rules, those in which the superselection sectors are labeled by unitary irreducible representations of a compact symmetry group. The second method uses the concept of the format of a message sent between parties—by verifying the format, the recipient of a message can check whether the message could have been sent by a party who performed charge-conserving operations. By this method, we prove that protocols subject to general superselection rules (including those pertaining to non-Abelian anyons in two dimensions) are no more secure than protocols in the unrestricted world. However, the proof applies only to two-party protocols. Our results show in particular that, if no assumptions are made about the computational power of the cheater, then secure quantum bit commitment and strong quantum coin flipping with arbitrarily small bias are impossible in a world subject to superselection rules.