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Collective Chasing Behavior between Cooperators and Defectors in the Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma

Ichinose, Genki and Saito, Masaya and Suzuki, Shinsuke (2013) Collective Chasing Behavior between Cooperators and Defectors in the Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma. PLoS ONE, 8 (7). Art. No. e67702 . ISSN 1932-6203. PMCID PMC3702560. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067702. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20130814-083208274

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Abstract

Cooperation is one of the essential factors for all biological organisms in major evolutionary transitions. Recent studies have investigated the effect of migration for the evolution of cooperation. However, little is known about whether and how an individuals’ cooperativeness coevolves with mobility. One possibility is that mobility enhances cooperation by enabling cooperators to escape from defectors and form clusters; the other possibility is that mobility inhibits cooperation by helping the defectors to catch and exploit the groups of cooperators. In this study we investigate the coevolutionary dynamics by using the prisoner’s dilemma game model on a lattice structure. The computer simulations demonstrate that natural selection maintains cooperation in the form of evolutionary chasing between the cooperators and defectors. First, cooperative groups grow and collectively move in the same direction. Then, mutant defectors emerge and invade the cooperative groups, after which the defectors exploit the cooperators. Then other cooperative groups emerge due to mutation and the cycle is repeated. Here, it is worth noting that, as a result of natural selection, the mobility evolves towards directional migration, but not to random or completely fixed migration. Furthermore, with directional migration, the rate of global population extinction is lower when compared with other cases without the evolution of mobility (i.e., when mobility is preset to random or fixed). These findings illustrate the coevolutionary dynamics of cooperation and mobility through the directional chasing between cooperators and defectors.


Item Type:Article
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0067702DOIArticle
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0067702PublisherArticle
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0067702.s002PublisherVideo S1
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0067702.s003PublisherVideo S2
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0067702.s004PublisherVideo S3
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0067702.s005PublisherVideo S4
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0067702.s006PublisherVideo S5
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0067702.s007PublisherVideo S6
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3702560/PubMed CentralArticle
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Suzuki, Shinsuke0000-0002-9816-9423
Additional Information:© 2013 Ichinose et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Received December 8, 2012; Accepted May 23, 2013; Published July 5, 2013. Editor: Petter Holme, Umeå University, Sweden. Funding: This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant-in-Aid for JSPS Fellows Number 232648. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript. Author Contributions: Conceived and designed the experiments: GI SS. Performed the experiments: GI MS. Analyzed the data: GI. Contributed reagents/ materials/analysis tools: GI MS. Wrote the paper: GI SS.
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS)232648
Issue or Number:7
PubMed Central ID:PMC3702560
DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0067702
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20130814-083208274
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20130814-083208274
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:39906
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:27 Aug 2013 23:26
Last Modified:09 Nov 2021 23:47

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