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Feints

Hendricks, Kenneth and McAfee, R. Preston (2006) Feints. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 15 (2). pp. 431-456. ISSN 1058-6407. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:HENjems06

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Abstract

In both economic and military situations, agents may try to mislead rivals about their true types or plans, whatever they may be. We consider a simple model in which one player attacks and the other player defends. We show that such environments have two types of possible equilibrium behavior, depending upon the signaling technology. If the signal is not very revealing about the attacker's plans, then the attacker always invests more resources in attack than in misdirection. If the technology is revealing, then the attacker does not always feint, but when he feints, he invests more than half of his resources into misdirection. Comparative statics also depend on whether the technology is revealing. "Always mystify, mislead and surprise the enemy, if possible." —General Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson "Create havoc in the east and strike in the west." —Sun Tze


Item Type:Article
Additional Information:© 2006, The Authors. We thank audiences at Northwestern, Arhus, Heidelberg, Rochester, Wisconsin, ITAM, UC-San Diego and, in particular, Hugh Neary, Eric Maskin, Larry Samuelson, Guofu Tan, anonymous referees, and an associate editor for helpful discussions and comments. Ken Hendricks thanks SSHRCC for financial support.
Issue or Number:2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:HENjems06
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:HENjems06
Alternative URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00106.x
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:4133
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Archive Administrator
Deposited On:28 Jul 2006
Last Modified:02 Oct 2019 23:10

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