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Misconceptions and Game Form Recognition: Challenges to Theories of Revealed Preference and Framing

Cason, Timothy N. and Plott, Charles R. (2014) Misconceptions and Game Form Recognition: Challenges to Theories of Revealed Preference and Framing. Journal of Political Economy, 122 (6). pp. 1235-1270. ISSN 0022-3808. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20131210-141208524

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Abstract

This study explores the tension between the standard economic theory of preference and nonstandard theories of preference that are motivated by an underlying theory of framing. A simple experiment fails to measure a known preference. The divergence of the measured preference from the known preference reflects a mistake, arising from some subjects’ misconception of the game form. We conclude that choice data should not be granted an unqualified interpretation of preference revelation. Mistakes in choices obscured by a possible error at the foundation of the theory of framing can masquerade as having been produced by nonstandard preferences.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/677254 DOIArticle
http://www.jstor.org/stable/info/10.1086/677254PublisherArticle
https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2151661DOIWorking Paper
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140403-155709665UNSPECIFIEDWorking Paper
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Cason, Timothy N.0000-0001-9581-5015
Additional Information:© 2014 by The University of Chicago. For helpful comments we thank three anonymous referees, Peter Bossaerts, Gary Charness, James Cox, Vincent Crawford, Dirk Engelmann, David Grether, Ori Heffetz, David Levine, Vai-Lam Mui, Rosemarie Nagel, Anmol Ratan, Aldo Rustichini, Matthew Shum, Charles Sprenger, Kathryn Zeiler, and presentation audiences at the University of California, Santa Barbara, University of Southern California, Purdue, Stanford, Monash, and Economic Science Association and Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory conferences. We retain responsibility for our interpretation and for any mistakes or misconceptions. Data are provided as supplementary material online.
Subject Keywords:preference elicitation; misconceptions; reference dependence; endowment effect
Issue or Number:6
Classification Code:JEL: C8 C9
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20131210-141208524
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20131210-141208524
Official Citation:Misconceptions and Game Form Recognition: Challenges to Theories of Revealed Preference and Framing Timothy N. Cason and Charles R. Plott Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 122, No. 6 (December 2014), pp. 1235-1270 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Article DOI: 10.1086/677254 Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/677254
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:42932
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Susan Vite
Deposited On:24 Mar 2014 22:41
Last Modified:02 Jun 2020 17:23

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