Plott, Charles R. (1974) On Game Solutions and Revealed Preference Theory. Social Science Working Paper, 35. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20131218-143710230
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Abstract
Several connections between concepts underlying the theory of revealed preference and the concepts underlying solutions to cooperative games, have been established by Wilson. In this paper we provide some new connections. Wilson established the relationship between the solution concept of Von Neumann and Morgenstern and the strongest forms of rational choice found at Richter and Hansson. Here, for the cases of finite sets of alternatives, we provide connections with weaker "degrees" of rationality found at Plott, Richter, and Sen.
| Item Type: | Report or Paper (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Group: | Social Science Working Papers |
| Series Name: | Social Science Working Paper |
| Issue or Number: | 35 |
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20131218-143710230 |
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20131218-143710230 |
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. |
| ID Code: | 43069 |
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS |
| Deposited By: | INVALID USER |
| Deposited On: | 24 Mar 2014 23:08 |
| Last Modified: | 03 Oct 2019 06:04 |
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