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A Note on the Symmetry between Bribes and Charges

Plott, Charles R. and Mestelman, Stuart (1968) A Note on the Symmetry between Bribes and Charges. Water Resources Research, 4 (1). pp. 195-197. ISSN 0043-1397. doi:10.1029/WR004i001p00195.

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It has been argued that within a dynamic setting, without complete information, the tax and bribe methods of correcting externalities give asymmetrical results. A model is presented which shows that the bribe alternative under such conditions yields optimal results, whereas the tax alternative does not. This conclusion is the opposite of conclusions drawn from other models advanced in the literature on the subject. It cannot be said that within such a setting one policy is better than the other, since all such conclusions depend upon the particular characteristics of each model.

Item Type:Article
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Additional Information:© 1968 American Geophysical Union. Manuscript received August 16, 1967.
Subject Keywords:quality of water, economics, water management
Issue or Number:1
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20140220-102143986
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Official Citation:Plott, C. R., and S. Mestelman (1968), A note on the symmetry between bribes and charges, Water Resour. Res., 4(1), 195–197, doi:10.1029/WR004i001p00195
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:43894
Deposited On:20 Feb 2014 18:52
Last Modified:10 Nov 2021 16:44

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