A Caltech Library Service

The Allocation of Landing Rights by Unanimity Among Competitors

Grether, David M. and Isaac, R. Mark and Plott, Charles R. (1981) The Allocation of Landing Rights by Unanimity Among Competitors. American Economic Review, 71 (2). pp. 166-171. ISSN 0002-8282.

PDF - Published Version
See Usage Policy.


Use this Persistent URL to link to this item:


During the late 1960's, air congestion often involving long delays or "stacks" was common at major airports. The right to land and take off was allocated on a first-come, first-served basis with little coordination among scheduled carriers. Since 1968, the four major airports in the United States, La Guardia, Washington National, John F. Kennedy International, and O'Hare International, have been operating under a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) high-density ruling which limits the number of slots (takeoffs and landings per hour) at each of these airports.

Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ItemWorking Paper
Additional Information:© 1981 American Economic Association. Also published in Current And Classic Readings For Microeconomic Literacy, a Thomson Custom Solutions publication. Financial support from the National Science Foundation and the Caltech Program of Enterprise and Public Policy is gratefully acknowledged.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Caltech Program of Enterprise and Public PolicyUNSPECIFIED
Other Numbering System:
Other Numbering System NameOther Numbering System ID
Social Science Working Paper350
Issue or Number:2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20140220-105902716
Persistent URL:
Official Citation:The Allocation of Landing Rights by Unanimity Among Competitors David M. Grether, R. Mark Isaac and Charles R. Plott The American Economic Review , Vol. 71, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Third Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 1981) , pp. 166-171 Published by: American Economic Association Article Stable URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:43898
Deposited On:20 Feb 2014 19:12
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 06:12

Repository Staff Only: item control page