A Caltech Library Service

Competitive Equilibrium with Middlemen: An Empirical Study

Plott, Charles R. and Uhl, Jonathan T. (1981) Competitive Equilibrium with Middlemen: An Empirical Study. Southern Economic Journal, 47 (4). pp. 1063-1071. ISSN 0038-4038.

PDF - Published Version
See Usage Policy.


Use this Persistent URL to link to this item:


Public distrust of middlemen frequently occurs in market systems. Boycotts, regulations, and investigations of middlemen are not uncommon [3; 7]. This position of disfavor is somewhat paradoxical since application of economic theory suggests that competition among middlemen can be relied upon to protect consumers and producers. According to received doctrine any differences in purchase and resale prices would reflect the costs involved in market making. Nevertheless public suspicion remains.

Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription Article
Additional Information:© 1981 Southern Economic Association. Financial support provided by the National Science Foundation and by the Caltech Program for Enterprise and Public Policy is gratefully acknowledged.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Caltech Program for Enterprise and Public PolicyUNSPECIFIED
Other Numbering System:
Other Numbering System NameOther Numbering System ID
Social Science Working Paper313
Issue or Number:4
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20140220-111245997
Persistent URL:
Official Citation:Competitive Equilibrium with Middlemen: An Empirical Study Charles R. Plott and Jonathan T. Uhl Southern Economic Journal , Vol. 47, No. 4 (Apr., 1981) , pp. 1063-1071 Published by: Southern Economic Association Article Stable URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:43900
Deposited By: Susan Vite
Deposited On:20 Feb 2014 19:25
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 06:12

Repository Staff Only: item control page