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Markets for contracts: experiments exploring the compatibility of games and markets for games

Plott, Charles R. and Williamson, Dean V. (2000) Markets for contracts: experiments exploring the compatibility of games and markets for games. Economic Theory, 16 (3). pp. 639-660. ISSN 0938-2259.

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The research explores the relationship between games and the economic environment in which the games might be embedded. The focus is on a market institution in which agents buy and sell rights to participate in the follow-on stage of strategic interaction. The central question posed concerns how two different types of processes, the game and the market, interact. The market converges to a competitive equilibrium that is consistent with the Nash equilibrium that obtains in the game, and the convergence of the market to a competitive equilibrium lags the convergence of behaviors in the game to the Nash equilibrium.

Item Type:Article
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URLURL TypeDescription ItemEarlier version published as Social Science Working Paper 1061 ReadCube access ItemBook Chapter
Additional Information:© 2000 Springer-Verlag. Received: April 19, 1999; revised version: 24 July, 1999. We thank Tim Cason and an anonymous referee for thoughtful comments and suggestions. We conducted the research with support from the National Science Foundation and the Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science.
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Caltech Laboratory of Experimental Economics and Political ScienceUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:compatibility of markets and games, simultaneous equilibration, dynamic adjustment processes, institutions
Issue or Number:3
Classification Code:JEL: C72, C90
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20140224-140218171
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:43951
Deposited By: Susan Vite
Deposited On:24 Feb 2014 22:19
Last Modified:12 May 2020 20:53

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