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The simultaneous, ascending auction: dynamics of price adjustment in experiments and in the UK3G spectrum auction

Plott, Charles R. and Salmon, Timothy C. (2004) The simultaneous, ascending auction: dynamics of price adjustment in experiments and in the UK3G spectrum auction. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 53 (3). pp. 353-383. ISSN 0167-2681. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140303-164524335

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Abstract

We develop a model of the behavior of bidders in simultaneous ascending auctions based on two principles: principle of surplus maximization and principle of bid minimization. These principles lead to models of both price dynamics and equilibration, leading to disequlibrium structural equations that can be used for estimating bidder values. The intention behind the development of this methodology is to provide an auctioneer a method of extracting information during an auction about possible closing prices. We benchmark the performance of the model with data from experimental auctions and then apply it to the UK UMTS or Third Generation Mobile Auction.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2003.01.003 DOIArticle
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268103001586PublisherArticle
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171103-164629754Related ItemWorking Paper
Additional Information:© 2003 Elsevier B.V. Received 22 July 2002; accepted 26 January 2003. The authors would like to thank participants at the 2001 ESA meetings in Barcelona and the 2001 INFORMS annual meeting as well as seminar attendees at Humboldt University in Berlin and Clemson University for many useful comments. We would also like to thank the National Science Foundation, Caltech’s Lee Center for Advanced Networking and Caltech’s Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science for financial and technical support.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
NSFUNSPECIFIED
Caltech Lee Center for Advanced NetworkingUNSPECIFIED
Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political ScienceUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:multiple unit auctions, value estimation, spectrum auctions
Other Numbering System:
Other Numbering System NameOther Numbering System ID
Social Science Working Paper1155
Issue or Number:3
Classification Code:JEL: C7, C9, C5
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20140303-164524335
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140303-164524335
Official Citation:Charles R. Plott, Timothy C. Salmon, The simultaneous, ascending auction: dynamics of price adjustment in experiments and in the UK3G spectrum auction, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 53, Issue 3, March 2004, Pages 353-383, ISSN 0167-2681, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2003.01.003. (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268103001586)
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:44115
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Susan Vite
Deposited On:04 Mar 2014 15:59
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 06:14

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