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Cooperative Game Models of the Influence of the Closed Rule in Three Person, Majority Rule Committees: Theory and Experiment

Isaac, R. Mark and Plott, Charles R. (1978) Cooperative Game Models of the Influence of the Closed Rule in Three Person, Majority Rule Committees: Theory and Experiment. In: Game Theory and Political Science. New York University Press , New York, pp. 283-322. ISBN 9780814761564. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140304-153203656

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Abstract

Many committees operate through subcommittees which are charged with the task of gathering information, debating the issues, and finally drafting motions for consideration and ratification by the committee of the whole. No doubt this process saves time and enhances the ability of the entire decision-making body to address many issues, but a cursory application of game theory suggests that it may also change substantially the character of decisions made by the larger committee. That is, the theory implies that even if the committee of the whole took an extraordinary amount of time on each decision, gathering information and debating the issues, the resulting decisions might deviate substantially from those that would have emerged from a subcommittee process.


Item Type:Book Section
Additional Information:© 1978 Published for the Center for Applied Economics New York University. The research support of the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. We also wish to thank the members of the Caltech seminar in experimental methods for many helpful comments and Professor Michael Maschler for his comments regarding the structure of the bargaining set.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
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Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20140304-153203656
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140304-153203656
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:44132
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Susan Vite
Deposited On:05 Mar 2014 18:19
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 06:14

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