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The Stingy Shift Explained as a Majority Rule Equilibrium

Plott, Charles R. and Agha, Gul (1977) The Stingy Shift Explained as a Majority Rule Equilibrium. Social Science Working Paper , 166. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA.

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[Introduction] Baron, Roper and Baron (1974) claim that group decisions regarding contributions to a charitable cause sometimes represent generally stingier options than the options picked by individuals when choosing alone. Their study and interpretations are consistent with a sizable social psychological literature which postulate:o; that "choice shifts" of various kinds occur as a result of group decision. Theories used to explain "choice shifts" usually rest on principles of group decision involving concepts like cultural values, responsibility, leadership, etc. In the present case, for example, the diffusion of personal responsibility for uncharitable behavior was offered as one explanation for smaller mean donations by groups.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:Financial support provided by the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. He wish to thank our colleagues, David Grether and Forrest Nelson, for observations and suggestions. We also wish to thank Professors R.$. Baron, G. Roper, and P.H. Baron for supplying,us with the data generated from their experimental series.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
National Science FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:166
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20140304-155330028
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:44135
Deposited On:26 Mar 2014 23:53
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 06:14

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