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On the Anatomy of the "Nonfacilitating" Features of the Double Auction Institution in Conspiratorial Markets

Clauser, Laura and Plott, Charles R. (1992) On the Anatomy of the "Nonfacilitating" Features of the Double Auction Institution in Conspiratorial Markets. In: The double auction market: institutions, theories, and evidence. Proceedings volume in the Santa Fe Institute studies in the sciences of complexity. No.14. Addison-Wesley , Reading, MA, pp. 333-353. ISBN 9780201622638.

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Effective conspiracies are more easily formed in posted-offer and in sealed-bid markets than in double auction markets. A feature of double auctions is isolated as the possible source of the behavioral differences. The double auction presents conspirators with continuous temptations to defect from conspiratorial agreements. It also fosters a second type of competition among sellers for access to buyers caused by the fact that only one quotation can be exposed to the market at any instant in time. An extreme case of the restricted exposure feature is the New York rule that requires that only the (first) best offers are exposed to the market and can be replaced only by better offers. This second type of competition can be interpreted as a coordination problem for volume allocation that could interact with other features of the process to undermine conspiracy. The research demonstrates that this second type of competition cannot account for observed differences. When the second type of competition is removed through the creation of a special type of market organization called The Individualized Seller Market Double Auction, the conspiracies still have little or no effectiveness.

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Additional Information:© 1992 Addison-Wesley. The research support of the National Science Foundation and the Caltech Laboratory of Experiments in Economics and Political Science is gratefully acknowledged. Clauser is a senior at Occidental College and Plott is a professor at Cal tech. The comments of Mark Isaac led to several changes in this paper and are greatly appreciated.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
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Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political ScienceUNSPECIFIED
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Social Science Working Paper771
Series Name:Proceedings volume in the Santa Fe Institute studies in the sciences of complexity
Issue or Number:14
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20140311-145930385
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:44260
Deposited On:18 Mar 2014 21:48
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 06:16

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