CaltechAUTHORS
  A Caltech Library Service

Careerism, Committee Assignments and the Electoral Connection

Katz, Jonathan N. and Sala, Brian R. (1996) Careerism, Committee Assignments and the Electoral Connection. American Political Science Review, 90 (1). pp. 21-33. ISSN 0003-0554. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140314-120456710

[img]
Preview
PDF - Published Version
See Usage Policy.

3462Kb

Use this Persistent URL to link to this item: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140314-120456710

Abstract

Most scholars agree that members of Congress are strongly motivated by their desire for reelection. This assumption implies that members of Congress adopt institutions, rules, and norms of behavior in part to serve their electoral interests. Direct tests of the electoral connection are rare, however, because significant, exogenous changes in the electoral environment are difficult to identify. We develop and test an electoral rationale for the norm of committee assignment "property rights." We examine committee tenure patterns before and after a major, exogenous change in the electoral system-the states' rapid adoption of Australian ballot laws in the early 1890s. The ballot changes, we argue, induced new "personal vote” electoral incentives which contributed to the adoption of "modern" congressional institutions such as property rights to committee assignments. We demonstrate a marked increase in assignment stability after 1892, by which time a majority of states had put the new ballot laws into force, and earlier than previous studies have suggested.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2082795 DOIArticle
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2082795JSTORArticle
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Katz, Jonathan N.0000-0002-5287-3503
Additional Information:© 1996 American Political Science Association. The authors thank the Office of Graduate Studies and Research and Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego, for research support. Katz acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation, partial funding provided by NSF grant SES- 9022882 and by the Research Board, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. We thank Garrison Nelson, Gary Cox, Mathew McCubbins, and the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research for supplying data. We further thank Mike Alvarez, Gary Cox, Will Heller, Gary Jacobson, Sam Kernell, Mathew McCubbins, Scott Morgenstern, Keith Poole, Bing Powell, Paul Quirk, Glenn Sueyoshi, Barry Weingast, and Bob Weissberg for their helpful comments.
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
University of California San DiegoUNSPECIFIED
NSFSES-9022882
University of Illinois Urbana-ChampaignUNSPECIFIED
Issue or Number:1
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20140314-120456710
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140314-120456710
Official Citation:Careerism, Committee Assignments, and the Electoral Connection Jonathan N. Katz and Brian R. Sala The American Political Science Review , Vol. 90, No. 1 (Mar., 1996) , pp. 21-33 Published by: American Political Science Association Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2082795
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:44336
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jonathan Katz
Deposited On:17 Mar 2014 14:55
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 06:16

Repository Staff Only: item control page