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Market architectures, institutional landscapes and testbed experiments

Plott, Charles R. (1994) Market architectures, institutional landscapes and testbed experiments. Economic Theory, 4 (1). pp. 3-10. ISSN 0938-2259. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140324-114845297

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Abstract

Designer markets are becoming a reality. A merger of theory and experimental work is setting stages for a different kind of economics. The modern theory of mechanisms suggests that it is possible to design markets and/or decentralized mechanisms that can perform tasks that were thought to be impossible. The mechanisms themselves can become active participants with computers solving complex optimization or coordination problems based on "messages" submitted to the system by decentralized agents. Competition becomes utilized in new ways in the context of what are becoming known as "smart markets." Testbed experiments are demonstrating that such processes can be developed beyond purely theoretical discussions. Paper processes, mechanisms found only as ideas on the pages of a journal, are being transformed to operating processes with a physical presence that can be studied and modified by practical considerations. Policy research has expanded to incorporate the ideas; and traces of such modern theorizing can be found in institutions that are being put into place. The five papers contained in this issue represent different stages of the new approach to economic research.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF01211116PublisherUNSPECIFIED
Additional Information:© 1994 Springer-Verlag. Received: September 24, 1993.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
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Social Science Working Paper866
Issue or Number:1
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20140324-114845297
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140324-114845297
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:44464
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Susan Vite
Deposited On:02 Apr 2014 21:58
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 06:18

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