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An Experimental Analysis of Unanimity in Public Goods Provision Mechanisms

Banks, Jeffrey S. and Plott, Charles R. and Porter, David P. (1988) An Experimental Analysis of Unanimity in Public Goods Provision Mechanisms. Review of Economic Studies, 55 (2). pp. 301-322. ISSN 0034-6527. http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140324-145338589

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Abstract

The paper reports on an experimental investigation of four methods of allocating public goods. The two basic processes studied are direct contribution and a public goods auction process. Both of these processes are studied with and without an additional unanimity feature. The results suggest that the auction process outperforms direct contribution. The effect of unanimity is to decrease the efficiency of both processes. Much of the paper is focused on an analysis of these results.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2297583 DOIArticle
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/content/55/2/301.shortPublisherArticle
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170914-133142840Related ItemWorking Paper
Alternate Title:An experimental analysis of public goods provision mechanisms with and without unanimity
Additional Information:© 1988 The Society for Economic Analysis Limited. Funding provided by the National Science Foundation and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is gratefully acknowledged. We are indebted to John Ledyard for his helpful comments and suggestions. The comments of Mark Olson (JPL) on the statistical analysis and his computer programming assistance are acknowledged.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
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Social Science Working Paper595
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20140324-145338589
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140324-145338589
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:44477
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Susan Vite
Deposited On:01 Apr 2014 21:58
Last Modified:13 Nov 2017 22:44

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