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Legal Fees: A comparison of the American and English Rules

Plott, Charles R. (1987) Legal Fees: A comparison of the American and English Rules. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 3 (2). pp. 185-192. ISSN 8756-6222. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140324-153353819

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Abstract

[Introduction] This note is intended to explore some of the issues raised l)y Avery Katz's provocative paper. The question posed in his paper is whether the English rule or the American rule generates more legal fees. Katz uses game theoretic motivation for the elasticity measures that are central to his analysis. However, the analysis proceeds in terms of elasticity models so the implications of the underlying game theory remain rather obscure. The approach taken here is to analyze a game-theoretic model directly to discover where the basic principles of the theory lead. The basic approach is similar to other papers and the contribution here is to work out the details of an easy-to-follow example.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
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http://www.jstor.org/stable/764825PublisherArticle
Additional Information:Copyright 1987 by Yale University. The financial support of the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. Comments of Jeff Strand and Jennifer Reinganum were helpful.
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National Science FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Issue or Number:2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20140324-153353819
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140324-153353819
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:44480
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Susan Vite
Deposited On:25 Mar 2014 21:14
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 06:18

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