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Revenue Generating Properties of Sealed-Bid Auctions: An Experimental Analysis of One-Price and Discriminative Processes

Miller, Gary J. and Plott, Charles R. (1985) Revenue Generating Properties of Sealed-Bid Auctions: An Experimental Analysis of One-Price and Discriminative Processes. In: Research in Experimental Economics. Vol.3. JAI Press , Greenwich, CT, pp. 159-181. ISBN 0-89232-337-X. http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140325-112523293

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Abstract

The two most prominent forms of sealed-bid auctions are the discriminative pricing rule and the one-price (or "competitive") rule. With the discriminative rule such as that used by the U.S. Treasury for the sale of revenue bonds, each buyer pays a price equal to his/her accepted bid. That is, when a quantity Q is offered for sale, the Q highest bids are accepted and the successful buyer pays a price equal to his/her bid. With the one-price mechanism such as that used in French auctions of new stock issues, the successful buyer pays a price equal to the lowest accepted bid. That is, when a given quantity, Q, is offered for sale, the highest Q bids are accepted and each successful buyer pays a price equal to the lowest accepted bid.


Item Type:Book Section
Additional Information:© 1985 JAI Press Inc. The financial support of the National Science Foundation, the Caltech Program for Enterprise and Public Policy, the Guggenheim Foundation, and the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford is gratefully acknowledged.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
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NSFUNSPECIFIED
Caltech Program for Enterprise and Public PolicyUNSPECIFIED
Guggenheim FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Stanford Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral SciencesUNSPECIFIED
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Social Science Working Paper234
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20140325-112523293
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140325-112523293
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:44497
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Susan Vite
Deposited On:02 Apr 2014 20:09
Last Modified:01 May 2014 22:10

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