A Caltech Library Service

How long to Pareto efficiency?

Babichenko, Yakov (2014) How long to Pareto efficiency? International Journal of Game Theory, 43 (1). pp. 13-24. ISSN 0020-7276. doi:10.1007/s00182-013-0365-y.

Full text is not posted in this repository. Consult Related URLs below.

Use this Persistent URL to link to this item:


We consider uncoupled dynamics (each player knows only his own payoff function) that reach outcomes that are Pareto efficient and individually rational. We show that in the worst case the number of periods it takes to reach these outcomes must be exponential in the number of players and hence the same number of periods it takes to reach Nash equilibria. For social welfare maximizing outcomes we provide a tight bound on the minimal number of steps required for reaching such an outcome by uncoupled dynamics.

Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ReadCube access
Additional Information:© 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. Received: 3 August 2011; Accepted: 3 January 2013; Published online: 10 February 2013. This work is part of the author’s Ph.D. thesis.The author wishes to thank his supervisor Sergiu Hart for his support and guidance and Noam Nisan for useful discussion. This research was partially supported by ERC Grant 0307950, and by ISF Grant 0397679.
Funding AgencyGrant Number
European Research Council (ERC)0307950
Israel Science Foundation0397679
Issue or Number:1
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20140326-100632585
Persistent URL:
Official Citation:Babichenko, Y. (2014). How long to Pareto efficiency? International Journal of Game Theory, 43(1), 13-24. doi: 10.1007/s00182-013-0365-y
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:44522
Deposited By: Jason Perez
Deposited On:27 Mar 2014 23:38
Last Modified:10 Nov 2021 16:53

Repository Staff Only: item control page