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The Continuous Combinatorial Auction Architecture

Plott, Charles R. and Lee, Hsing-Yang and Maron, Travis (2014) The Continuous Combinatorial Auction Architecture. American Economic Review, 104 (5). pp. 452-456. ISSN 0002-8282.

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The paper reports the architecture of a continuous combinatorial auction. Preferences are based on sets of items and feasibility requires the nonintersection of sets. Countdown clocks replace eligibility and activity requirements typical of rounds-based auctions. Bids remain in the system to be combined with new bids to form winning collections. Increment requirements dictate improvements over appropriate collections of existing bids. The auction evolved from experimental methods and operates at high levels of efficiency. Field applications are reported and result in natural equilibration in a few hours as opposed to days or weeks required by round-based architectures.

Item Type:Article
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Additional Information:© 2014 American Economic Association. We thank Eiichiro Kazumori, Nicola Lansdell, Bill Stevenson, and Arch Roberts, Jr.
Issue or Number:5
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20140403-110525103
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Official Citation:Plott, Charles R., Hsing-Yang Lee, and Travis Maron. 2014. "The Continuous Combinatorial Auction Architecture." American Economic Review, 104(5): 452-56.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:44639
Deposited By: Susan Vite
Deposited On:24 Apr 2014 23:34
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 06:20

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