A Caltech Library Service

Discussion: Salmon on Explanatory Relevance

Hitchcock, Christopher Read (1995) Discussion: Salmon on Explanatory Relevance. Philosophy of Science, 62 (2). pp. 304-320. ISSN 0031-8248. doi:10.1086/289858.

PDF - Published Version
See Usage Policy.


Use this Persistent URL to link to this item:


One of the motivations for Salmon's (1984) causal theory of explanation was the explanatory irrelevance exhibited by many arguments conforming to Hempel's covering-law models of explanation. However, the nexus of causal processes and interactions characterized by Salmon is not rich enough to supply the necessary conception of explanatory relevance. Salmon's (1994) revised theory, which is briefly criticized on independent grounds, fares no better. There is some possibility that the two-tiered structure of explanation described by Salmon (1984) may be pressed into service, but more work would have to be done. Ironically, Salmon's difficulties are similar to those suffered by his seventeenth-century predecessors.

Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription DOIArticle
Additional Information:© 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association. Published by The University of Chicago Press. Received July 1994; revised September 1994. I am grateful to Wes Salmon and Jim Woodward for their many discussions with me on this topic.
Issue or Number:2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20140408-100430952
Persistent URL:
Official Citation:Salmon on Explanatory Relevance Christopher Read Hitchcock Philosophy of Science, Vol. 62, No. 2 (Jun., 1995), pp. 304-320 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association Article Stable URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:44749
Deposited On:15 Apr 2014 17:43
Last Modified:10 Nov 2021 16:56

Repository Staff Only: item control page