A Caltech Library Service

Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation

Bikhchandani, Sushil and Chatterji, Shurojit and Lavi, Ron and Mu'alem, Ahuva and Nisan, Noam and Sun, Arunava (2006) Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation. Econometrica, 74 (4). pp. 1109-1132. ISSN 0012-9682. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00695.x.

See Usage Policy.


Use this Persistent URL to link to this item:


We characterize dominant-strategy incentive compatibility with multidimensional types. A deterministic social choice function is dominant-strategy incentive compatible if and only if it is weakly monotone (W-Mon). The W-Mon requirement is the following: If changing one agent's type (while keeping the types of other agents fixed) changes the outcome under the social choice function, then the resulting difference in utilities of the new and original outcomes evaluated at the new type of this agent must be no less than this difference in utilities evaluated at the original type of this agent.

Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
Additional Information:Manuscript received October, 2005; final revision received March, 2006. Article published online 19 June 2006 This paper subsumes parts of "Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions," by Lavi, Mu'alem, and Nisan, and of "Incentive Compatibility in Multi-Unit Auctions," by Bikhchandani, Chatterji, and Sen. We are grateful to Liad Blumrosen, Joe Ostroy, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, Benny Moldovanu, Dov Monderer, Motty Perry, Phil Reny, Amir Ronen, and Rakesh Vohra for helpful comments. We are especially grateful to six referees and two co-editors whose comments led to substantial improvements in this paper. Bikhchandani was supported by National Science Foundation under Grant SES-0422317, and Lavi, Mu'alem, and Nisan were supported by Israeli Science Foundation and USA–Israel Bi-National Science Foundation.
Subject Keywords:Dominant-strategy implementation, multi-object auctions
Issue or Number:4
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:BIKe06
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:5052
Deposited By: Archive Administrator
Deposited On:25 Sep 2006
Last Modified:08 Nov 2021 20:22

Repository Staff Only: item control page