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Committee proposals and restrictive rules

Banks, Jeffrey S. (1999) Committee proposals and restrictive rules. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 96 (14). pp. 8295-8300. ISSN 0027-8424. PMCID PMC22228. doi:10.1073/pnas.96.14.8295.

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I analyze a game-theoretic model of committee–legislature interaction in which a majority decision to adopt either an open or closed amendment rule occurs following the committee’s proposal of a bill. I find that, in equilibrium, the closed rule is almost always chosen when the dimension of the policy space is >1. Furthermore, the difference between the equilibrium outcome and that which would have occurred under the open rule can be arbitrarily small.

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Additional Information:© 1999 National Academy of Sciences. Edited by Kenneth A. Shepsle, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, and approved May 14, 1999 (received for review March 11, 1999). This paper was submitted directly (Track II) to the Proceedings office. The first draft of this paper was written while the author was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University. He gratefully acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation under Grant SBR-9601236 and thanks Keith Krehbiel, David Baron, David Austen-Smith, Tom Romer, Matthew Jackson, Wolfgang Pesendorfer, and three anonymous referees for valuable comments. The publication costs of this article were defrayed in part by page charge payment. This article must therefore be hereby marked "advertisement" in accordance with 18 U.S.C. §1734 solely to indicate this fact.
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Issue or Number:14
PubMed Central ID:PMC22228
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20141126-122952822
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Official Citation:Jeffrey S. Banks Committee proposals and restrictive rules PNAS 1999 96 (14) 8295-8300; doi:10.1073/pnas.96.14.8295
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:52183
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:26 Nov 2014 23:05
Last Modified:10 Nov 2021 19:22

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