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Stability in Anarchic International Systems

Niou, Emerson M. S. and Ordeshook, Peter C. (1990) Stability in Anarchic International Systems. American Political Science Review, 84 (4). pp. 1207-1234. ISSN 0003-0554.

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Can stability emerge solely from the competition and self-interest of sovereign powers existing in a state of anarchy, or does stability depend on restraints from the complex nexus of interdependencies characterizing the contemporary world economy and its associated institutions? We suppose some infinitely divisible resource, that all nation-states are endowed with and maximize and that enables them to overcome adversaries in the event of conflict. We offer a noncooperative, extensive-form model of international conflict without exogenous mechanisms to enforce agreements in order to learn under what conditions balance of power and collective security ensure the sovereignty of all states in anarchic systems. We conclude that there exists at least one world-albeit an abstract one-in which anarchy yields stability.

Item Type:Article
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Additional Information:© 1990 American Political Science Association.
Issue or Number:4
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20141205-105524643
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Official Citation:Stability in Anarchic International Systems Emerson M. S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook The American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 4 (Dec., 1990), pp. 1207-1234 Published by: American Political Science Association Article Stable URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:52432
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:09 Dec 2014 22:49
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 07:42

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