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Contention Resolution under Selfishness

Christodoulou, George and Ligett, Katrina and Pyrga, Evangelia (2010) Contention Resolution under Selfishness. In: Automata, Languages and Programming. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. No.6199. Springer-Verlag , Berlin, pp. 430-441. ISBN 978-3-642-14161-4.

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In many communications settings, such as wired and wireless local-area networks, when multiple users attempt to access a communication channel at the same time, a conflict results and none of the communications are successful. Contention resolution is the study of distributed transmission and retransmission protocols designed to maximize notions of utility such as channel utilization in the face of blocking communications. An additional issue to be considered in the design of such protocols is that selfish users may have incentive to deviate from the prescribed behavior, if another transmission strategy increases their utility. The work of Fiat et al. [8] addresses this issue by constructing an asymptotically optimal incentive-compatible protocol. However, their protocol assumes the cost of any single transmission is zero, and the protocol completely collapses under non-zero transmission costs. In this paper, we treat the case of non-zero transmission cost c. We present asymptotically optimal contention resolution protocols that are robust to selfish users, in two different channel feedback models. Our main result is in the Collision Multiplicity Feedback model, where after each time slot, the number of attempted transmissions is returned as feedback to the users. In this setting, we give a protocol that has expected cost 2n + clog n and is in o(1)-equilibrium, where n is the number of users.

Item Type:Book Section
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
Ligett, Katrina0000-0003-2780-6656
Additional Information:© 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. Partially supported by DFG grant Kr 2332/1-3 within Emmy Noether Program and by EPSRC grant EP/F069502/1.
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG)Kr 2332/1-3
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC)EP/F069502/1
Series Name:Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Issue or Number:6199
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20141208-131734269
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:52473
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:09 Dec 2014 21:32
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 07:42

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