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Seniority in Legislatures

McKelvey, Richard D. and Riezman, Raymond (1992) Seniority in Legislatures. American Political Science Review, 86 (4). pp. 951-965. ISSN 0003-0554.

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We construct a stochastic model of a legislature with an endogenously determined seniority system. We model the behavior of the legislators as well as their constituents as an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar game. The game has a stationary equilibrium with the property that the legislature imposes on itself a non-trivial seniority system, and that incumbent legislators are always reelected.

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Additional Information:© 1992 American Political Science Association. This paper was funded in part by National Science Foundation Grants SES-864348 and SES-9022932 to the California Institute of Technology and SES-9023056 to the University of Iowa. This paper was written in part while Raymond Riezman was a visiting professor at the California Institute of Technology. We thank Ken Shepsle and Jeff Banks for useful comments on earlier drafts.
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Issue or Number:4
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20150114-101742922
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Official Citation:Seniority in Legislatures Richard D. McKelvey and Raymond Riezman The American Political Science Review Vol. 86, No. 4 (Dec., 1992) , pp. 951-965 Published by: American Political Science Association Stable URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:53692
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:14 Jan 2015 20:46
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 07:51

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