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Judicial lobbying: The politics of labor law constitutional interpretation

Iaryczower, Matias and Spiller, Pablo T. and Tommasi, Mariano (2006) Judicial lobbying: The politics of labor law constitutional interpretation. American Political Science Review, 100 (1). pp. 85-97. ISSN 0003-0554. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:IARapsr06

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Abstract

This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes, and sheds light to the determinants of lobbying in separation-of-powers systems. We provide conditions for judicial decisions to be sensitive to legislative lobbying, and find that lobbying falls the more divided the legislature is on the relevant issues. We apply this framework to analyze supreme court labor decisions in Argentina, and find results consistent with the predictions of the theory.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055406062022DOIUNSPECIFIED
Additional Information:Copyright © 2006 by the American Political Science Association. We would like to thank Andy Atkeson, Juliana Bambaci, Rui de Figueiredo, Christian Hellwig, David K. Levine, Leeat Yariv, and seminar participants at MPSA, UCLA, and Berkeley for helpful comments.
Subject Keywords:SUPREME-COURT; CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS; ACTION COMMITTEES; SIGNALING GAMES; INFORMATION; EQUILIBRIA; ARGENTINA; MATTER
Issue or Number:1
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:IARapsr06
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:IARapsr06
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:5920
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Lindsay Cleary
Deposited On:08 Nov 2006
Last Modified:02 Oct 2019 23:27

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