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How to Control Controlled School Choice

Echenique, Federico and Yenmez, M. Bumin (2015) How to Control Controlled School Choice. American Economic Review, 105 (8). pp. 2679-2694. ISSN 0002-8282. doi:10.1257/aer.20130929.

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We characterize choice rules for schools that regard students as substitutes while expressing preferences for a diverse student body. The stable (or fair) assignment of students to schools requires the latter to regard the former as substitutes. Such a requirement is in conflict with the reality of schools' preferences for diversity. We show that the conflict can be useful, in the sense that certain unique rules emerge from imposing both considerations. We also provide welfare comparisons for students when different choice rules are employed.

Item Type:Article
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URLURL TypeDescription ItemSSWP 1366
Echenique, Federico0000-0002-1567-6770
Additional Information:© 2015 American Economic Association. We thank Estelle Cantillon, Lars Ehlers, Sean Horan, Mark Johnson, Juan Pereyra Barreiro, Ariel Rubinstein, Kota Saito, Yves Sprumont, and Utku Ünver for their helpful comments, as well as seminar audiences at multiple universities and conferences. We are particularly grateful to Scott Kominers, Parag Pathak, and Tayfun Sönmez for their comments and advice on existing controlled school choice programs. Karen Hannsberry, manager at the office of access and enrollment at Chicago Public Schools, very kindly answered all our questions about their program. Finally, we are very grateful to the three anonymous referees for their suggestions, which have led to a much improved version of the paper. Yenmez gratefully acknowledges financial support from National Science Foundation grant SES-1326584. The authors declare that they have no relevant material or financial interests that relate to the research described in this paper. Formerly SSWP 1366.
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Issue or Number:8
Classification Code:JEL: D47, H75, I21, I28
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20150828-083614475
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:59939
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:11 Sep 2015 20:01
Last Modified:10 Nov 2021 22:27

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